کابل پرس

Can Afghan Islamists Learn from their Egyptian Counterparts?

Said Sabir Ibrahimi — 2012-08-05T18:42:36Z

The fall of Hosni Mubarak's autocratic regime in early 2011 led to some eye-catching transformation of the Egyptian society. The previously banned Islamic political parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood have accomplished huge political success by participating in the parliamentary and presidential elections. In the 1970s the Brotherhood denounced violence and has gone through some reforms. The Brotherhood has enjoyed a great amount of support by many Egyptians. They gave the organization the most unprecedented political achievement in the world by an Islamist group through nonviolent political participation. Islamism in other parts of the world is on the rise; the question is whether a nonviolent approach is practical in their respective countries and regions. In particular, in Afghanistan where there has been four decades of ongoing war under the name of Islam, is an Egyptian style of Islamism possible?

The trend shows that an Egyptian style of Islamism is impractical in Afghanistan. Ironically, some of the Afghan Islamist groups like Hizbe Islami Gulbudin Hekmatyar (HIG) once was inspired by the Brotherhood and in fact was deemed the Afghan branch of the Brotherhood. The current style of Islamism in the country leaves little room for the Brotherhood's peaceful approach to prevail. There are three main reasons for Afghan Islamism's failure: (1) mostly, Afghan Islamists are unreasonably traditionalist, and they live in the past, (2) in general, they are not fighting for the Islam, but for personal gain and political power, and (3) Afghan Islamism is not a national cause, because its funding and motivations come from outside. The vicious deeds of these groups have been the testimony of their extreme and aggressive nature. The impediment has been the Taliban, HIG, Haqqani Network (HN) and similar groups. While Islam is a compatible religion, Afghan Islamists have been living in the past and incompatibility.

One classic example is how they treat women. In the 1980s, HIG members threw acid in the faces of girls to prevent them from attending school. In mid 1990s, the Taliban, banned women from all educational opportunities, whereas the in neighboring Islamic states like Iran and Pakistan women lived with more dignity and rights. In Egypt's Brotherhood organization, women represented nearly half the members. Another classic example is how Afghan Islamists are obsessed with exoteric rituals. Under the Taliban, Afghan men were forced to grow beards, whereas in Saudi Arabia, the center of Islam, many are clean-shaved. Minorities such as Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan were mistreated, compared to Egypt where Coptic Christians have played a major role in the country's politics – most recently the Egyptian President Mohammed Mursi promised to appoint a Coptic Christian as a senior member of cabinet.

The Taliban, the HIG, the HN and others must accept the fact that we live in a globalized 21st century world, where societies are interdependent and interconnected. Unless the Afghan Islamists disown living in the past, there is no hope for moving forward. This does not mean giving up their Muslim identity; many Islamic states today play major roles in international politics and diplomacy.

It is understandable that there are many issues with the current Afghan system's injustice, corruption, insecurity and so on. President Karzai admitted the existence of these problems. However, the war under the name of Islam in Afghanistan is not there to tackle the above mentioned issues, rather the war is a struggle for power and personal gain. The discourse is that insurgents are fighting the infidels and foreigners, but the civil war of the 1990s tells us otherwise. The HIG and HN actively participated in the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, after the fall of the communist regime. Gulbudin who was given the Prime Minister position, rejected the proposal and fought for power under the name of Islam, and his hostility continues until today. The Taliban fought other Jehadi groups for some five years after gaining control of Kabul in mid 1990s. For four decades the rockets and bombs of the Afghan Islamists have been destroying the homes and lives of Afghans. The Brotherhood, moved towards community development and building houses and shelters for the poor. Despite ongoing pressure by the Mubarak regime, the organization acted peacefully and took part in community mobilization, charity work, and development.

There is no doubt that an overwhelming majority of Afghans are devoted Muslims, and that Afghanistan is an Islamic State. However, not many believe in militant Islam. Studies show that many Afghans have joined the insurgency because of the lack of economic opportunities. In general, Afghan society does not condone radicalism. Having lived and travelled to the villages of Bamyan, Herat, Balkh, Farah, Nengarhar, and Wardak, miles away from urban areas, I have seen the quest of food, education and a better future in the eyes of the men and women, girls and boys of Afghanistan.
It is the foreigners, namely Afghanistan's neighbors, who for political reasons, use the radical element to sabotage the country. They have created monsters like Mulla Omar, Haqqani and Gulbudin, who are there just for the money. In between, unfortunately, some Afghans fall for their deception.

In contrast, the Brotherhood's efforts are supported by a majority of the Egyptians. Foreigners do not tell them what to do and what to not do. Hostile Islamism is not a national cause of Afghans, it is an individual's cause. The real Afghan Islamism is the thirst for peace.

Today, Islamists in Afghanistan argue that they are performing Jihad against the foreigners in Afghanistan. FYI: the foreigners are packing up to leave. It is hard to understand what kind of holy war are they achieving by destroying Afghan schools built with charity money; by arbitrary arresting and slaughtering Afghans and accusing innocent people as spies for the foreigners and the government; by orchestrating suicide attacks in Afghan marketplaces and bus stops where innocent people including children are martyred; by killing defenseless women with a shot of a Kalashnikov to their heads. Surely, they do not have any plausible answer to these questions. By terrorizing a nation, the extremists think they will win. Maybe political power can be achieved through violence, but is it moral and sustainable? The big question is, is it Islamic? History shows that the Taliban regime collapsed in less than five years, and the regimes before it did not last long either. All were based on violence and aggression toward people.

Said Sabir Ibrahimi is an Afghan national, born and raised in Kabul. He has a degree in Political Science from Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey, USA. He has worked with several international organizations, in the field of refugee rights and development, in Afghanistan. He can be reached at saberibrahimi@gmail.com and https://www.facebook.com/saberibrahimi

The Taliban Response to Peace

Said Sabir Ibrahimi — 2012-06-15T04:59:17Z

With the Afghan conflict almost completing a fourth decade, there is an urgent need for peace. In 2005, the re-emergence of the insurgency became a serious challenge for the Afghan government and the international community. The question is how serious the stakeholders, mainly the government and the anti-government elements (AGEs) are, in relation to bringing long-lasting stability in the country. The Afghan government has made multiple attempts to end the chronic conflict. However, the insurgents do not seem so interested in peace. The Afghan government with the support of international community has taken two major initiatives.

The first initiative was the establishment of a Peace and Reconciliation Commission (PRC) in 2005, led by former president and a spiritual leader, Hazrat Sebghatullah Mujaddidi. Admittedly, the PRC did lack a clear peace agenda. There were conflicting views on what needed to be done with militant leaders such as Mullah Omar, of the Taliban, and Gulbudin Hekmatyar, of Hizbi Islami of Gulbudin (HIG) and others. Afghan officials including President Hamid Karzai and Mujaddidi favored amnesty. One of the proposals was to release cooperating militants from Afghan and American prisons, including Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Airbase. The main criteria to join the peace process were to lay down weapons, respect the Afghan constitution and government, and return to civilian life. The Americans were reluctant to release the militants, fearing their re-engagement in terrorist activities. But the Afghans were thirsty for peace.

The Taliban response was rather different. In return they expedited their assaults on Afghan and international forces. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMA), between 2001 to 2005 there had been only 7 suicide attacks across the county whereas in 2006 there were 123, and halfway through 2007 there were 77 suicide bombings. These attacks targeted mainly the Afghan and foreign military. However, a substantial number of civilians were indiscriminately killed. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that some 929 Afghan civilians died in 2006 by the Pro Government Forces (PGFs), including International Security Assistance Mission (ISAF) forces, and AGEs. Some 699 of the deaths were attributed to suicide bombings and attacks by the AGEs. In 2007, the number jumped to a minimum of 1,633 civilian deaths, and 950 of deaths were caused by the insurgents.

After the failure of the PRC to bring the AGEs to the negotiating table, the Afghan government took a second initiative and established a High Peace Council (HPC). This was in early 2010 after a Consultative Loya Jirga (Great Council) was held in Kabul. Some 2000 Afghan political elites, provincial representatives and civil society members attended the Jirga to discuss ways to reach peace. The Jirga passed a resolution which laid out a framework for negotiations with “the dissatisfied groups” and requested international support for the Afghan peace process.

Little has changed since the beginning of the HPC. The Taliban and their associates, including the Pakistani-based Haqqani Network, have continued their murderous attacks affecting the lives of many Afghans. In 2011, the UNAMA documented some 3,021 deaths, that is an 8% increase over 2010 and 25% more than 2009 retrospectively. Some 2,332 of the deaths were attributed to the AGEs while the remaining was caused by the PGFs.

On Sep13 2011, the Haqqani Network attacked the US embassy in Kabul leaving 11 civilian deaths including 6 children. The Network is also accused of the 2008 attacks on the Indian embassy, where 54 people died. In the month after the US embassy bombing, two Talib commanders assassinated Afghan chief peace negotiator, and head of the HPC, Professor Burhanudin Rabbani. In May 2012 another senior member of the HPC, Mullah Arsala Rahmani, was assassinated by gunmen. However, the Taliban did not claim responsibility. Most recently, on June 6, two suicide bombers detonated themselves and killed some 20 Afghan civilians in the southern city of Kandahar.

The ultimate goal of the insurgents has been to terrorize people and undermine the Afghan government's and international community's efforts towards creating a democratic society. Reminding us of their hostility towards women, they have poisoned hundreds of female students by putting toxic chemicals in school water wells and tanks.

The Taliban's militant strategy to reach to power has also its side effects. Every day, lives are lost on both sides of the war. As an indirect result, NATO unilateral airstrikes have taken hundreds of civilian lives over the past years. A recent case was on 6 June in Logar province where 18 civilians were killed.

Clearly, many insurgents favor fighting over negotiating peace. In a report by The Office of Director of National Intelligence, some 95 of 599 from Guantanamo rejoined insurgent groups fighting the American interest around the world. Some extra 72 are suspected of reengaging in terrorist activities. The number does not sound huge; only 15.9% are actually engaging and 12% are suspected of getting involved in militancy, nevertheless it shows that there are elements in the insurgency circles who are not interested in peace at all.

If the Taliban were serious about peace, they would have laid down their weapons and participated in the Afghan political process, an act encouraged by the Afghan government and people. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Jehadi groups (holy warriors who fought the Russians) went through the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program moderated by the UN. The Taliban could have gone through the same process. All this could have also halted NATO airstrikes on Afghan villages where innocent lives are lost in almost every assault. Moreover, the Taliban position on peace talks varies from groups to individuals. There is no single contact point where the Afghan government and international stakeholders can refer to for reconciliation talks.

A majority of Afghans do not support the return of a Talibani regime but if the Taliban want to take part in the political process, by denouncing violence, Afghans would have no objection to their participation. Many Afghans know that the Taliban will not win the executive office as they do not enjoy the support of overwhelming majority of people. However, they might win in local elections for house and senate seats and can then participate in Afghan politics.

But what happens if the Taliban want to continue fighting? The Afghan government and international community should set aside their appeasement policies towards insurgents. Inevitably, military assaults should be expedited. Insurgent safe heavens should be targeted in and outside of Afghanistan accurately and coordinated so as to avoid civilian casualties. In the process, Afghan security forces should be fully equipped and trained to fight insurgency after 2014.

Note: in this article the term Taliban, insurgents and terrorist have been used interchangeably, in the author's view there is little difference between them and they all support each other. As former Taliban Political Committee Chief, Agha Jan Mutasem said in his interview on June 1, 2012 with BBC Persian “The Haqqani Network is an inseparable part of the Taliban.”